RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2015 · 17 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesConflict StudiesEconomicsArmed ConflictInsurgencyPolitical ViolenceIncome DistributionInsurgent Violence Against CiviliansRural EconomyRural Income DistributionRural InsurgencyInsurgent RelationsInsurgent ViolenceLocal Revenue SourcesRebellion DynamicsRural Household IncomesRural IncomesRural RebellionRural Warfare
Insurgents in civil conflict typically target both government forces and civilians. This paper examines a rebel group’s strategic choices of its targets and the intensity of violence. In a simple theoretical framework, negative labour income shocks are predicted to: (i) increase violence against civilians to prevent them from being recruited as police informers; and (ii) increase violence against the government through increased rebel recruitment, but only if the rebels ’ tax base is sufficiently independent from local labour productivity. These theoretical predictions are confirmed in the context of India’s Naxalite conflict between 2005 and 2010. Exploiting variation in annual rainfall in a panel of district-level casualty numbers, I find that negative rainfall shocks: (i) increase Maoist violence against civilians; (ii) increase Maoist violence against security forces, but only in those districts in which the Maoists have access to key mineral resources.