Phenomenological and recovery models of the subjective experience of psychosis: discrepancies and implications for treatment

Abstract

Reductionist models of schizophrenia and psychosis have been criticized for neglecting first person experiences of these conditions. In response, at least two distinct bodies of research have emerged which study first person experience: philosophical phenomenology and approaches linked with the recovery movement. Phenomenological writings have produced a conceptual model of schizophrenia referred to as the ipseity disturbance model, whereas the recovery writings generalize from common and diverse experiences of movements toward well-being. Phenomenological writings focus on how lived experience in psychosis deviates from health whereas recovery writings concentrate on lived experience amid a return to health. These differences make it difficult to see how the two approaches might be integrated to inform treatment. To explore how these views diverge and potentially could converge we carefully examine major tenets in each body of literature and offer future roads which may provide opportunities for reconciliation among each perspective’s important contributions.