PrivGuard: Protecting Sensitive Kernel Data From Privilege Escalation Attacks

Abstract

Kernels of operating systems are written in low-level unsafe languages, which make them inevitably vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. Most existing kernel defense mechanisms focus on preventing control-data attacks. Recently, attackers have turned the direction to non-control-data attacks by hijacking data flow, so as to bypass current defense mechanisms. Previous work has proved that noncontrol-data attacks are the critical threat to kernels. One of the important purposes of these attacks is to achieve privilege escalation by overwriting sensitive kernel data. The goal of our research is to develop a lightweight protection mechanism to mitigate non-control-data attacks that compromise sensitive kernel data. We propose an approach that enforces data integrity of sensitive kernel data by preventing the illegal write to these data to mitigate privilege escalation attacks. The main challenge of the proposed approach is to validate the modification of sensitive kernel data at runtime. The validation routine must verify the legitimacy of the duplicated sensitive data and ensure the credibility of the verification. To address this challenge, we modify the system call entry point to monitor the change of the sensitive kernel data without any change to Linux access control mechanism. Then, we use stack canaries to protect the duplication of sensitive kernel data that are used for integrity checking. In addition, we protect the integrity of sensitive kernel data by forbidding illegal updates to them. We have implemented the prototype for Linux kernel on Ubuntu Linux platform. The evaluation results of our prototype demonstrate that it can mitigate privilege escalation attacks and its performance overhead is moderate.