USENIX Security Symposium · 2018 · 14 citations · 23 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityOperating SystemsSecurity ArchitectureMemory ManagementMicroarchitectural SecurityOperating System SecuritySecure System DesignSystem SecurityHeap OrganizationHeap OverflowsOverhead ReductionPerformance OverheadPerformance Overhead AnalysisRandomizationSecure Resource Allocation
Due to the on-going threats posed by heap vulnerabilities, we design a novel secure allocator -- GUARDER--to defeat these vulnerabilities. GUARDER is different from existing secure allocators in the following aspects. Existing allocators either have low/zero randomization entropy, or cannot provide stable security guarantees, where their entropies vary by object size classes, execution phases, inputs, or applications. GUARDER ensures the desired randomization entropy, and provides an unprecedented level of security guarantee by combining all security features of existing allocators, with overhead that is comparable to performance-oriented allocators. Compared to the default Linux allocator, GUARDER'S performance overhead is less than 3% on average. This overhead is similar to the previous state-of-the-art, Free-Guard, but comes with a much stronger security guarantee. GUARDER also provides an additional feature that allows users to customize security based on their performance budget, without changing code or even recompiling. The combination of high security and low overhead makes GUARDER a practical solution for the deployed environment.
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László Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei et al. · 2013 · 658 citations · Full text
AddressSanitizer: a fast address sanity checker
Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander Potapenko et al. · USENIX Annual Technical Conference · 2012 · 642 citations
Emery D. Berger, Kathryn S. McKinley, Robert D. Blumofe et al. · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · 2000 · 449 citations · Full text
Emery D. Berger, Benjamin G. Zorn · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · 2006 · 405 citations