Theoretical Economics Letters · 2018 · 14 citations · 8 references
Social SciencesEconomicsEnvironmental PolicyCarbon ManagementEnvironmental EconomicsMacroeconomicsCarbon Emissions ManagementCarbon MarketsCarbon PricingClimate FinanceEmissions TradingGreenhouse Gas AccountingCarbon Emissions PolicyCarbon Emissions RegulationCarbon Emissions TradingEmissions Allowance TradingStock Market Returns
In response to mounting evidence of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, in 2011, the Chinese central government decided to build a nationwide carbon emissions scheme, beginning with seven pilot schemes launched in 2013. These pilot schemes were based on the similar European Emissions Trading Scheme. Oestreich and Tsiakas [1] examine the European scheme, finding when carbon emission allowances were granted free of charge, firms who received them (defined as “dirty” firms) outperformed the firms who did not (defined as “clean firms”), indicating that there is a significant “carbon premium.” This study follows the methodology of Oestreich and Tsiakas [1] with Chinese data from the largest of the pilot schemes, the Shenzhen Pilot Emissions Trading Scheme. We find no positive, significant carbon premium but do find weak evidence of a negative premium for a special group of “very dirty” firms.
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… and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns
Campbell R. Harvey, Yan Liu · Review of Financial Studies · 2015 · 2K citations · Full text