German Economic Review · 2018 · 23 citations · 47 references
Public AffairsPolitical SciencePublic AdministrationDecentralizationFiscal PolicyLocal GovernmentAccountabilityAdministrative DecentralizationAnti-corruption GovernanceDecentralization PolicyFiscal DecentralizationIntergovernmental Fiscal InstitutionsBureaucratic Rent SeekingDecentralization EffectsDecision PowerLocal Government Anti-corruptionMunicipal CorruptionProvincial Fiscal DecentralizationRent-seeking BehaviorRent-seeking Incentives
Abstract This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruptionminimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision-making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent-seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non-linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.
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