2018 · 46 citations · 21 references
ComputingComputer ScienceCybersecurityComputer SecurityCybercrimeNetwork SecurityComparative CybercrimeDomain Name SystemIntrusion DetectionDns MeasurementDomain Name AnalysisDomain Name System VulnerabilitiesDomain Name UseMalicious Domain RegistrationRegistrationSpam DetectionThreat Feeds
To enhance competition and choice in the domain name system, ICANN introduced the new gTLD program, which added hundreds of new gTLDs (e.g. .nyc, .io) to the root DNS zone. While the program arguably increased the range of domain names available to consumers, it might also have created new opportunities for cybercriminals. To investigate that, we present the first comparative study of abuse in the domains registered under the new gTLD program and legacy gTLDs (18 in total, such as .com, .org). We combine historical datasets from various sources, including DNS zone files, WHOIS records, passive and active DNS and HTTP measurements, and 11 reputable abuse feeds to study abuse across gTLDs. We find that the new gTLDs appear to have diverted abuse from the legacy gTLDs: while the total number of domains abused for spam remains stable across gTLDs, we observe a growing number of spam domains in new gTLDs which suggests a shift from legacy gTLDs to new gTLDs. Although legacy gTLDs had a rate of 56.9 spam domains per 10,000 registrations (Q4 2016), new gTLDs experienced a rate of 526.6 in the same period-which is almost one order of magnitude higher. In this study, we also analyze the relationship between DNS abuse, operator security indicators and the structural properties of new gTLDs. The results indicate that there is an inverse correlation between abuse and stricter registration policies. Our findings suggest that cybercriminals increasingly prefer to register, rather than hack, domain names and some new gTLDs have become a magnet for malicious actors. ICANN is currently using these results to review the existing anti-abuse safeguards, evaluate their joint effects and to introduce more effective safeguards before an upcoming new gTLD rollout.
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EXPOSURE : Finding malicious domains using passive DNS analysis
Leyla Bilge · 2011 · 486 citations
Seven Months' Worth of Mistakes: A Longitudinal Study of Typosquatting Abuse
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The long Taile of typosquatting domain names
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