Current Issues in Auditing · 2016 · 19 citations · 14 references
BusinessAccountancyTort LawAuditingCorporate DisclosureNegligenceAudit ReportingFinancial Statement AuditsFinancial Statement FraudFraud DetectionFraud ReportingLiability RecognitionAudit Judgment RiskAudit LiabilityAuditor NegligenceCritical Audit Matters
Audit practitioners, academics, and attorneys worry that disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) may raise jurors’ liability judgments for auditors who miss misstatements. CAM disclosures lower jurors’ liability judgments for undetected fraud that is difficult to foresee, but unrelated CAMs neither increase nor decrease judgments relative to the current regime and may dilute the impact of warranted disclosures. Data are available from the authors upon request.
ABSTRACT Audit practitioners, academics, and attorneys have expressed concern that disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) will increase jurors' auditor liability judgments when auditors fail to detect misstatements. In contrast, this study provides theory and experimental evidence that CAM disclosures, under certain conditions, reduce auditor liability judgments as jurors perceive that undetected fraudulent misstatements were more foreseeable to the plaintiff (i.e., the financial statement user suing the auditor). However, we find that CAM disclosures only reduce auditor liability for undetected misstatements that, absent CAM disclosure, are relatively difficult to foresee. Finally, CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent misstatements neither increase nor reduce auditor liability judgments relative to the current regime (i.e., where CAMs are not disclosed), but reduce liability judgments relative to reporting that there were no CAMs. As such, we find that, relative to stating there were no CAMs, disclosure of any CAM (i.e., related or unrelated) provides litigation protection in cases of undetected fraud. Consequently, the CAM requirement could incentivize auditors to disclose innocuous boilerplate CAMs, thereby diluting the impact of more warranted CAM disclosures. Data Availabliity: Available from authors upon request.
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