Do IFQs in the US Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery Impact Price and Size?

Abstract

Management of the “General Category” component of the US Atlantic sea scallop (Placopecten magellanicus) fishery changed from open access with a soft, or target, catch limit, to limited access with a hard catch limit, to individual fishing quotas (IFQs) in just three years. Two differences-in-differences (DiD) models are used to examine the causal effects of management on price and revenue. A hedonic price model finds that the IFQ program had minimal direct effects on prices. A landings composition model finds that the IFQ program increased landings of the largest scallops. The Limited Access fleet, which lands most of the scallops in the region and is managed primarily with input controls, serves as a control for both models. Our policy simulation finds that IFQs increased revenues by 2.6% compared to hard catch limits. However, the IFQ program did not increase revenues relative to the regulated open-access system.