The University of Chicago Law Review · 1970 · 12 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesCriminal LawMoral DevelopmentMoral PsychologyPhilosophy Of LawDeterrence TheoryNormative EthicsPunishment TheoryVirtue EthicsDeterrencePunishment Deterrence
Deterrence, both and special, is one of the traditionally accepted aims of the criminal law. This article will consider only deterrence: the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment. This concept will be used in its broad sense, including the so-called moral or educative effects of criminal law,' thus corresponding to the continental term general prevention. Legislators as well as criminal courts often base their decisions on considerations of deterrence. But on this ground has been attacked time and again in the literature as unjust. Bittner and Platt, for example, contend that punishment on the basis of deterrence is inherently unjust. For if an example is made of a person to induce others to avoid criminal actions then he suffers not for what he has done but on account of other people's tendency to do likewise.'2 This criticism, frequently raised, seems to rest on Kant's moral principle that man should always be treated as an end in himself, not only as a means for some other end.3 Ethical questions cannot be conclusively resolved by analysis and