1c:I[419806,["/_next/static/chunks/bb923814e1f4d2e9.js","/_next/static/chunks/dd3ee9f5b7716ca6.js","/_next/static/chunks/4204a0ae82542ca8.js","/_next/static/chunks/30036bedc5269936.js","/_next/static/chunks/6e1aa89a642f40be.js","/_next/static/chunks/cd5e572bc3e4eb92.js","/_next/static/chunks/8ffd0b71567920d8.js","/_next/static/chunks/67ea6dfd21f16c5f.js","/_next/static/chunks/24eb4379f68013fd.js","/_next/static/chunks/b8cd775ffdf935bd.js","/_next/static/chunks/983103cd9eb7b428.js","/_next/static/chunks/d4ac9dcf27f6ff52.js","/_next/static/chunks/294b9525248c8e5f.js"],"default"] 1d:T4d9,Given two discrete memoryless channels (DMC's) with a common input, it is desired to transmit private messages to receiver 1 rate R_{1} and common messages to both receivers at rate R_{o} , while keeping receiver 2 as ignorant of the private messages as possible. Measuring ignorance by equivocation, a single-letter characterization is given of the achievable triples (R_{1},R_{e},R_{o}) where R_{e} is the equivocation rate. Based on this channel coding result, the related source-channel matching problem is also settled. These results generalize those of Wyner on the wiretap channel and of Körner-Marton on the broadcast Channel.1e:T4c6,The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y, respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution P/sub XYZ/, can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a public channel. The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a negligible amount of information about S. Upper bounds on H(S) as a function of P/sub XYZ/ are presented. Lower bounds on the rate H(S)/N (as N to infinity ) are derived for the case in which X=(X/sub 1/, . . ., X/sub N/), Y=(Y/sub 1/, . . ., Y/sub N/) and Z=(Z/sub 1/, . . ., Z/sub N/) result from N independent executions of a random experiment generating X/sub i/, Y/sub i/ and Z/sub i/ for i=1, . . ., N. It is shown that such a secret key agreement is possible for a scenario in which all three parties receive the output of a binary symmetric source over independent binary symmetric channels, even when the enemy's channel is superior to the other two channels.< >

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