Sprinting with Small Steps: China’s Cadre Management and Authoritarian Resilience

Abstract

In the past two decades, a new pattern of cadre promotion has quietly emerged and reshaped Chinese politics. It has been observed that officials who have held a series of key positions briefly are more likely to rise higher in their careers than other officials, a pattern that is sometimes referred to as “sprinting with small steps.” This article examines this pattern using prefecture-level leadership data to test first an institution-based explanation and then a more encompassing political interpretation. Going deeper, our interviews with local cadres further reveal there is a dual-track system of cadre management: some cadres are preferred, cultivated, and promoted through a fast track that breaks Party regulations, while others have to earn their promotions through the regular track. The article then argues that the dual-track system, part of the Party’s broader pattern of what we call “selective institutionalization,” enables the regime to balance between legitimacy and domination and thus contributes to the resilience of the Chinese Communist regime.