Extreme Partnership in Afghanistan: Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, 2010-2011

Abstract

IN SEPTEMBER OF 2009, former Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) General Stanley McChrystal formally requested additional forces in Afghanistan to fight a war that had begun eight years before. He warned that without additional forces the conflict would likely result in failure. (1) The situation appeared dire. In his initial assessment to the Pentagon, General McChrystal went on to say, Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term--while Afghan security capacity matures--risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible. (2) The critical component in gaining the initiative was partnering with the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) in a much more inclusive and integrated manner than in the past. In the Arghandab District of Kandahar Province in 2010, our battalion pushed the limits of partnership in a meaningful way to create irreversible momentum against the insurgency. Challenges General McChrystal mentioned some of the shortcomings of ISAF units when he said that coalition forces had failed to aggressively defend the Afghan population. He said ISAF was pre-occupied with protection of our own forces; we have operated in a manner that distances us--physically and psychologically--from the people we seek to protect.... The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves. (3) That psychological distance was evident in our failure to comprehend the complex social, political, economic, and cultural affairs of Afghan society. McChrystal's report also highlighted the Afghan security force's inadequate performance and interaction with coalition units. McChrystal called for radically more integrated and work. (4) That last phrase stuck in my head as I planned my operational campaign over the next few months, and it caused me to reflect on my background in counterinsurgency. I knew that we would have to fight this insurgency in a vastly different way than we had during my previous tour in Kandahar in 2004. At that time, our battalion was at the large base on Kandahar Airfield and at one external combat outpost in a deserted area isolated from the population. Our connection with the Afghan people and security forces was evident, but it lacked a sense of depth and permanency. Our platoons conducted day and night patrols among the population but returned to base unseen by them. The Afghan security forces partnered with us during operations but then returned separately to their own camps. Our soldiers conducted temporary patrol base operations in villages, left after several days, and had no permanent presence inside the villages. We did not stop to evaluate our methods because there was relative peace in Kandahar in 2004, and the population was optimistic following the October elections. Five years later, the approach and the security situation had changed. In September 2009 the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division, led by Colonel Arthur Kandarian, began training to fight and win in Afghanistan by the following summer. Three months later it was announced that the brigade would deploy as the lead surge brigade of 30,000 Army forces to conduct operations in Regional Command (RC) South. (5) My battalion was one of four maneuver battalions from the brigade with the opportunity to employ counterinsurgency tactics. The Brigade Combat Team was the main effort in RC South from June to November of 2010, but our mission differed on this tour, mainly because it included protecting the Afghan people in partnership with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. Our destination was the historic Taliban stronghold in Arghandab and in the Zheri District in Kandahar province. Zheri is the spiritual homeland and birthplace of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, whose ideology still resonated with much of the population in the environs surrounding Kandahar City. The two districts were obvious places to concentrate forces against the insurgents. …