The Political Logic of a Downsian Space

Abstract

Anthony Downs (1957) applied the concept of spatial voting to understand electoral competition.His paradigm is the dominant frame for formal analysis of the strategic decisions of candidates, although its central implication-that candidates will converge on the median voter-is often at odds with facts.Ensuing behavioral and formal scholarship offers rationales for this apparent shortcoming.Limitations of standard surveys, however, have impeded the dialogue between these two promising lines of research.We introduce an experimental survey that overcomes these limitations, allowing analysis of insights culled from each perspective.Substantively, we focus on how parties' policy reputations interact with the people's partisan ties to condition their spatial judgements.We find that partisan biases distort spatial choices in accord with insights of the American Voter (Campbell, et. al. 1960).Contrary to the American Voter, however, we also find that partisan ties appear rooted in parties' policy reputations; reputations that, in turn, place limits on the freedom of politicians to exploit the biases of their partisan supporters.Overall, though, the constraints of the median voter are less stringent than often supposed, leaving candidates with underappreciated freedom to maneuver.