American Journal of Health Economics · 2017 · 103 citations · 11 references
PharmacyPharmaceutical PolicyControlled Substance PolicyDrug InformationPrescription DispensingDrug Safety MonitoringMedication AccessMedication UsePrescription Drug PolicyDrug Market DynamicsMedication Utilization PatternsPrescription Drug AccessPrescription Drug Monitoring ReportingPrescription Drug SurveillancePrescription Drug Utilization PatternsPrescription Monitoring Data UsePrescription Opioid Diversion
The diversion of controlled prescription drugs can arise through “doctor shopping,” where a patient obtains multiple prescriptions from different health-care providers without the providers' knowledge of the other prescriptions. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) aim to address this problem of asymmetric information. In this paper, I exploit cross-state variation in PDMP implementation dates to estimate the effect of PDMPs on drug quantities and deaths. I expand upon previous work by analyzing outcomes for prescription drugs within and outside the opioid class, by considering spillovers into the illegal drug market, and by relying on high-frequency administrative data spanning the years 2000–13. I also estimate the effect of two PDMP characteristics with the potential to narrow information asymmetries among providers: direct PDMP access and required PDMP use. I find that neither PDMP implementation nor direct PDMP access had a significant effect on outcomes. These findings hold across drug classes, drug markets, and specifications. I find evidence, however, suggesting that required PDMP use reduced prescription opioid and stimulant quantities by 9 percent and 11 percent, respectively. In turn, prescription opioid and benzodiazepine deaths decreased by 9 percent and 13 percent, respectively. I also find evidence, albeit weak, suggesting that illegal drug deaths increased.
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