Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) · 2017 · 116 citations · 21 references
ComputingComputer ScienceCybersecurityComputer SecuritySecurity ArchitectureWeb SecurityBrowser SecurityInvasion Of PrivacyWeb Application SecurityBandwidthBandwidth OverheadFingerprintingFull-duplex CommunicationHalf-duplex CommunicationPassive WebsiteTraffic AnalysisWebsite Fingerprinting
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a traffic analysis attack that allows an eavesdropper to determine the web activity of a client, even if the client is using privacy technologies such as proxies, VPNs, or Tor. Recent work has highlighted the threat of website fingerprinting to privacy-sensitive web users. Many previously designed defenses against website fingerprinting have been broken by newer attacks that use better classifiers. The remaining effective defenses are inefficient: they hamper user experience and burden the server with large overheads. In this work we propose Walkie-Talkie, an effective and efficient WF defense. Walkie-Talkie modifies the browser to communicate in half-duplex mode rather than the usual full-duplex mode; half-duplex mode produces easily moldable burst sequences to leak less information to the adversary, at little additional overhead. Designed for the open-world scenario, Walkie-Talkie molds burst sequences so that sensitive and non-sensitive pages look the same. Experimentally, we show that Walkie-Talkie can defeat all known WF attacks with a bandwidth overhead of 31% and a time overhead of 34%, which is far more efficient than all effective WF defenses (often exceeding 100% for both types of overhead). In fact, we show that Walkie-Talkie cannot be defeated by any website fingerprinting attack, even hypothetical advanced attacks that use site link information, page visit rates, and intercell timing. © 2017 by The USENIX Association. All Rights Reserved.
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Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale
Andriy Panchenko, Fabian Lanze, Andreas Zinnen et al. · 2016 · 580 citations · Full text
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
Steven J. Murdoch, George Danezis · 2005 · 513 citations
Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Andriy Panchenko, L. Niessen, Andreas Zinnen et al. · 2011 · 499 citations
Peek-a-Boo, I Still See You: Why Efficient Traffic Analysis Countermeasures Fail
Kevin P. Dyer, Scott E. Coull, Thomas Ristenpart et al. · 2012 · 456 citations