The Feasibility of Launching Rogue Transmitter Attacks in Indoor Visible Light Communication Networks

Abstract

One of the areas in which wireless networks based on visible light communication (VLC) are considered superior to traditional radio-based communication is security. The common slogan summarizing VLC security features is: WYSIWYS—”What You See Is What You Send”. However, especially in the case of infrastructure downlink communication, security with respect to data snooping, jamming and modification must be carefully provided for. This paper examines the physical layer aspects of VLC networks with respect to possible disruptions caused by rogue transmitters. We present the theoretical system model that we use in simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in a typical indoor environment. We use estimated bit error rate as a measure of the effectiveness of jamming and rogue data transmission. We find that it is quite easy to disrupt, and in some cases to even hijack legitimate transmission.