Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

Abstract

Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 by James A. Russell Stanford CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011 288 pages $24.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Innovation, Transformation, and War is an important and valuable effort to move beyond the cliches and slogans of how the Iraq War was waged and to analyze how US military units reversed the disastrous 2005 situations in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. The book originated as a doctoral dissertation by a career defense professional and, therefore, examines developments in Iraq within the framework of the theoretical literature on military innovation. While such issues will be of concern to a variety of readers, the importance of this work to many national security analysts will almost certainly center on its fine-grained analysis of how a variety of US Army and Marine Corps units adapted to a complex environment in Iraq and reoriented unsuccessful tactics and approaches to those that were significantly more effective. Russell is careful not to overreach and does not maintain that tactical level innovation won the war or even that it was the only reason for the reduction of insurgent violence. Other factors including local and national political issues must be included in such an assessment. The rise of anti-al Qaeda citizens' militias that later became the Awakening Councils was especially important. While the author maintains that extensive tactical innovation was only one factor in the struggle to move effectively against the insurgency, he also states that without it the United States would have lost the war. Russell notes that innovation occurs when unit leaders believe they are being insufficiently effective using current and tactics. In Iraq, this situation was apparent by 2005, and radical innovation was required for US forces to move forward in stabilizing the country. In this type of adapt or fail environment, he maintains that tactical change can accumulate over time and build a momentum of its own. The author speaks of informal doctrine and maintains that best practices often develop from the bottom up and then are shared with other units facing similar difficulties. Russell's analysis makes use of case studies of US Army and Marine Corps units in varying parts of Iraq including an Army Stryker-equipped brigade, distinct in its organization. The case study discussions are based on the extensive use of primary sources and contain some of the most detailed examinations of US tactical operations in Iraq that currently exists. The author's deep knowledge of military organizations and changing battlefield tactics are continuously put to good use throughout this study. The narrative about how units improved their military performance over time is especially interesting. …