Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals: Demonstration and Detection

TLDR

The study explores the vulnerability of civil maritime transport to deceptive GPS signals and develops a detection technique compatible with sensors commonly available on modern ships. An innovations‑based detection framework that optimally selects measurement sampling intervals to minimize the chance of a ship exceeding alert limits undetected, using sensors commonly available on modern vessels, is developed and analyzed. Analysis and a field experiment demonstrate that counterfeit GPS signals can hijack a vessel, exploiting its reliance on satellite navigation and masquerading as ocean currents, confirming the vulnerability of modern ships. © 2017 Institute of Navigation.

Abstract

An attacker's ability to control a maritime surface vessel by broadcasting counterfeit civil Global Positioning System (GPS) signals is analyzed and demonstrated. The aim of this work is to explore civil maritime transportation's vulnerability to deceptive GPS signals and to develop a detection technique that is compatible with sensors commonly available on modern ships. It is shown that despite access to a variety of high-quality navigation and surveillance sensors, modern maritime navigation depends crucially on satellite navigation and that a deception attack can be disguised as the effects of slowly-changing ocean currents. An innovations-based detection framework that optimally chooses the measurement sampling interval to minimize the probability of a ship exceeding its alert limits without detection is developed and analyzed. A field experiment confirms the vulnerability analysis by demonstrating hostile control of a 65-m yacht in the Mediterranean Sea. Copyright © 2017 Institute of Navigation