Strategic Behavior of Multi-Energy Players in Electricity Markets as Aggregators of Demand Side Resources Using a Bi-Level Approach

Maziar Yazdani-Damavandi, Nilufar Neyestani, Miadreza Shafie‐khah, Javier Contreras, João P. S. Catalào

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · 2017 · 142 citations · 34 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The coordination of various energy vectors under the concept of multi‑energy system (MES) has introduced new sources of operational flexibility to system managers. The study investigates how multi‑energy players trade across multiple carriers to maximize profits and reduce operational risks. The MES is modeled as a multilayer structure comprising the energy market, MEPs, local energy systems, and multi‑energy demand, with MEPs aggregating LES and participating in the wholesale electricity market, and their decision‑making conflicts are captured via a bilevel optimization framework. Numerical results show that MEPs acting as prosumers smooth demand and price profiles, and that increasing the MEP share mutually influences local and wholesale equilibrium prices.

Abstract

The coordination of various energy vectors under the concept of multi-energy system (MES) has introduced new sources of operational flexibility to system managers. In this paper, the behavior of multi-energy players (MEP) who can trade with more than one energy carrier to maximize their profits and mitigate their operational risks has been investigated. The MES is represented based on a multilayer structure, namely the energy market, MEP, the local energy system (LES), and multi-energy demand. In such environment, an MEP aggregates LES and participates in the wholesale electricity market, simultaneously to maximize its profit. The decision-making conflict of the MEP with other energy players for the aggregation of LES and participation in the electricity market is modeled based on a bilevel approach. Numerical results show the behavior of the MEP as a prosumer in the electricity market to produce smoother demand and price profiles. Results reveal a mutual effect of local and wholesale equilibrium prices by increasing the share of the MEP.

References

34