Evaluation of Smart Grid and Civilian UAV Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks

Abstract

Test results are presented from over-the-air civil GPS
\nspoofing tests from a non-negligible stand-off distance.
\nThese tests were performed at White Sands
\nMissile Range (WSMR) against two systems dependent
\non civil GPS, a civilian unmanned aerial vehicle
\n(UAV) and a GPS time-reference receiver used in
\n“smart grid” measurement devices. The tests against
\nthe civil UAV demonstrated that the UAV could be
\nhijacked by a GPS spoofer by altering the UAV’s perceived
\nlocation. The tests against the time-reference
\nreceiver demonstrated the spoofer’s capability of precisely
\ncontrolling timing from a distance, which means
\na spoofer could manipulate measurements used for
\nsmart grid control without requiring physical access
\nto the measurement devices. Implications of spoofing
\nattacks against each of these systems are also given.
\nRecommendations are presented for regulations regarding
\nGPS receivers used in critical infrastructure
\napplications. These recommendations include creating
\na certification process by which receivers are declared
\nspoof-resistant if they are able to detect or mitigate
\nspoofing attacks in a set of canned scenarios.
\nThe recommendations also call for a mandate that
\nonly spoof-resistant receivers be used in applications
\nclassified by the Department of Homeland Security
\n(DHS) as national critical infrastructure.