The Accounting Review · 2017 · 331 citations · 62 references
BusinessAccountancyTax LawBusiness EthicsTaxationWhistleblower ProtectionBehavioral Responses To TaxationFraud DetectionFraud ReportingPublic Employee Whistleblower ProtectionTax EvasionWhistleblowingData AvailabilityFinancial MisreportingRegulatorsReward-based WhistleblowingStatutory Whistleblower ProtectionsTax Whistleblower RewardsWhistleblower AllegationsWhistleblower Reward Structures
U.S. laws protect whistleblowers and encourage regulatory reward programs, yet evidence on their deterrent effect on financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness remains limited. The study investigates whether employee whistleblowing deters firms’ financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness. The authors analyze U.S. government whistleblower case data, comparing firms facing allegations to matched controls.
ABSTRACT U.S. laws provide explicit whistleblower protections and direct regulators to adopt ambitious programs to reward whistleblowing. However, there is limited evidence on whether employee whistleblowing deters financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness. Using a sample of employee whistleblower cases obtained from the U.S. government, I provide evidence that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations exhibit significant decreases in financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness, compared with control firms. I find that this deterrent effect persists for at least two years beyond the year of the allegation. JEL Classifications: H25; M41; M48. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.
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