W<scp>HAT </scp> D<scp>RIVES </scp> T<scp>ORT </scp> R<scp>EFORM </scp> L<scp>EGISLATION? </scp> A<scp>N </scp> A<scp>NALYSIS OF </scp> S<scp>TATE </scp> D<scp>ECISIONS TO </scp> R<scp>ESTRICT </scp> L<scp>IABILITY </scp> T<scp>ORTS</scp>

Abstract

A BSTRACT This article studies the timing of state‐level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. Using discrete‐time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity—as measured by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced—to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political‐institutional factors and regional effects—such as Republican control of the state government, single‐party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state's Democrats—are also associated with quicker reform adoption.