Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare

Abstract

AMERICA'S NOVEL USE of special operations forces (SOF), precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Afghanistan, proving both influential and controversial. Many believe it was responsible for the Taliban's sudden collapse. They see the as warfare's future and think it should become the new template for U.S. defense planning. Others, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly-a non-repeatable product of local con ditions. Both camps are wrong. The Afghan campaign does indeed offer important clues to the future of warfare, but not the ones most people think-because the war itselfwas not fought the way most people think. Both sides in the debate assume that the Afghan campaign was waged at standoff ranges, with precision weapons annihilating enemies at a distance, before they could close with U.S. commandos or in digenous allies. For proponents of the Afghan model, this is what gives the model its broad utility: with soF-guided bombs doing the real killing at a distance, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they have to do is screen U.S. commandos from occasional hostile survivors and occupy abandoned ground later on. America can thus defeat rogues at global distances with few U.S. casualties and little danger of appearing to be a conquering power. For Afghan model detractors, conversely, it is the apparent ability to annihilate from