Built-in Safeguards and the Implementation of Civil War Peace Accords

Abstract

This article contributes to analyses of peace agreement implementation by focusing on the role of built-in safeguards as procedural mechanisms within peace agreements. Recent empirical studies suggest that negotiated peace agreements are a frequent mode of armed conflict termination and implementation of those agreements to be the primary predictor of enduring peace and the quality of that peace. However, in many instances implementation takes years or even decades and is subject to breakdown before achieving the key implementation objectives. In this article, we identify and theorize three key safeguards in peace accords: transitional power-sharing, dispute resolution, and verification mechanisms. We argue that these safeguards lead to higher implementation of provisions negotiated in peace agreements by addressing mutual suspicion and by facilitating more constructive working relationships among former rivals. To test our arguments, we analyze implementation of comprehensive peace agreements negotiated between 1989 and 2012 from the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Data (PAM_ID). We find that the built-in safeguards that we have identified significantly explain variations in levels of peace agreement implementation.