Journal of Business & Financial Affairs · 2016 · 14 citations · 14 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceShareholder RightsOwnership StructureShareholder-manager ConflictsCorporate Performance Measurement
The objective of this work is to estimate the effect of the rights of employees on the sharing of the value added with the shareholders on the sample of 51Tunisian businesses belonging to the Tunisian index TUNINDEX during 2008-2012 period. Next, we aim to see if the ownership structure of firms can modify the report of force between the shareholders and the employees in terms of sharing this value. We will begin our article by a conceptual part in which we develop the hypotheses to be tested. In the second part, which will be empirical, we present, successively, the sample, the period of analysis, the variables used in our study, the model and the results obtained.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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