Common Law and Statute in the Law of Employment

Abstract

Remarkably, the interaction between common law and statute has not attracted the scholarly attention it deserves, given that it is such a basic component of legal reasoning in common law systems. This is especially true in the law of employment, where the interaction between common law and statute is a pervasive feature of modern employment law. In recent years, scholars have started to rise to the challenge of developing principles to regulate this interaction, and this article provides a contribution to those debates. It builds upon Lord Hoffmann’s controversial judgment in <it>Johnson v Unisys</it> to identify three modes of interaction: statute as pre-emptive of common law development; statute as an analogical stimulus of common law development; and common law fundamental rights. By connecting this analysis to background principles of legislative supremacy and fundamental rights, it argues that <it>Johnson v Unisys</it> provides an attractive constitutional vision of the relationship between Parliament and the courts.