Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2016 · 30 citations · 46 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsFinanceBankingCorporate FinanceFinancial EconomicsBank Risk ManagementBanking RegulationCapital Structure DeterminantsCapital Structure TheoryEquity FinancingFinancial RiskBank Capital ConstraintsCapital Structure RegulationEquity Issuance EffectsEquity Issuance RiskMoral Hazard AnalysisReit Seasoned Equity Offerings
Debt overhang and moral hazard predict that poorly capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to issue equity, while the presence of regulatory and market pressures posits an opposite theoretical prediction. By using an international sample of bank seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), we show that the likelihood of issuing SEOs is higher in poorly capitalized banks and that such banks prefer SEOs to alternative capitalization strategies. A series of tests exploring the variation of capital regulation and market discipline show that market mechanisms rather than capital regulation are the primary driver of the decision to issue by poorly capitalized banks.
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Determinants of corporate borrowing
Stewart C. Myers · Journal of Financial Economics · 1977 · 13.4K citations
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James R. Barth, Ross Levine · Journal of Financial Intermediation · 2003 · 2.3K citations
Law, Banking Law, Regulatory Policy +12