Theoretical Economics · 2017 · 59 citations · 32 references
ComputingBehavioral SciencesEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryBayesian Decision TheoryBayesian InferenceBayesian LearningBayesian ModelingBayesian StatisticsReinforcement LearningBayesian Active LearningBayesian Reinforcement LearningInformation AcquisitionLearning Under UncertaintyLearning With Imperfect Information
We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example with three actions shows that in a misspecified environment a myopic agent's beliefs converge while a sufficiently patient agent's beliefs do not. This illustrates a novel interaction between misspecification and the agent's subjective discount rate.
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Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses
A. Wald · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · 1945 · 1.7K citations · Full text
On the Consistency of Bayes Estimates
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