The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention

Abstract

The emergence of post-September 11 military operations in the context of the global fight against terrorism in general and the Iraq war in particular has overshadowed humanitarian interventions conducted by multilateral institu tions. However, the threat posed by genocidal governments deserves the con tinuing attention of global governance because their draconian policies and mobilization capacities constitute the actual weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. The tardy response of the international commu nity to atrocities in Darfur has been widely regarded as a backlash of the emerging norm in international society which attributes a responsibility to protect civilians targeted by g?nocidaires. This article, however, will argue that the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and NATO have in fact devised and implemented two innovative peacekeeping strate gies in Darfur that have set more optimistic precedents for humanitarian in tervention, namely, a new division of labor between regional and inter national organizations and a pragmatic turn in peacekeeping. By dint of these new strategies, intervening organizations have an opportunity to counter balance the deep-seated problems that routinely affect peacekeeping opera tions, namely, the body-bag syndrome and the rigidity of bureaucratic norms that regulate PKOs. Keywords: conflict management, Darfur, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, United Nations. his article will invoke the lessons learned from the Rwandan tragedy as a reflective point against which to consider the implications of I Darfur for peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Darfur and Rwanda will be regarded as two significant cases indicative of a wider tendency, or direction, in peacekeeping in the course of the past ten years and beyond. By investigating what has remained the same in peacekeeping since Rwanda, what advances have been made, and what could still be improved, it is possible not only to assess the most recent progress made with regard to PKOs but also to anticipate the future. This examination will argue that, although political will on the part of member states remains the most cru cial factor in explaining the success and failure of PKOs, structural trans formations in peacekeeping strategies can considerably alter that will and enable a more rapid and desirable response to humanitarian crises of the future.