The European Commission

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, I investigate a number of elements that are crucial to understand the lobbying activity of private interests in the European Commission. First, the Commission’s powers and responsibilities are analysed in order to study how they engender specific forms of lobbying at the European level. Secondly, the close interaction between the Commission and the lobbyists is analysed. Rather than viewing lobbying in the European Union (EU) institutions as a unidirectional activity of private interests vis-a`-vis this institution, it can better be conceived as an exchange relation between interdependent public and private actors (Bouwen 2002:368). In order to fully understand the interaction between the lobbyists and the European Commission, the latter should not be regarded as a single, unitary organization. It is an internally much fragmented organization (Nugent 2001:135; Christiansen 2006:108). The functional and hierarchical fragmentation within this supranational institution is studied because it influences to a great extent the lobbying strategies of private interests. Thirdly, the various instruments the Commission employs to actively shape the system of EU interest representation are investigated: money, rule-making power, and governance style. Finally, this chapter studies how the role of the Commission has changed in the EU policy-making process and the impact this evolution has had on EU lobbying.