ComputingCloud ComputingCybersecurityCloud InfrastructureCloud SecurityVirtualizationCloud Resource ManagementCloud Virtual Machine SecurityCloud VirtualizationSide-channel AttacksVirtual MemoryVirtualization SecurityBallooningCache Side-channel AttacksCloud Hypervisor SecurityMemory Balloon DriverSensitive Information LeakageShared MemoryShared Virtual MemoryVirtual Machines
Cloud providers usually use virtualization to maximize the utilization of their computing resources, e.g. many virtual machines (VMs) run on a shared physical infrastructure. However co-residency with other VMs will cause high security risks, such as side channel attacks. This kind of attack is difficult to detect and prevent, so it's necessary to study it deeply. Recent research has shown attackers can build up cross-VM side channels to obtain sensitive information. However, due to the features of shared resources (e.g. CPU cache), the sensitive information obtained is usually limited and coarse-grained. In this paper, we present a novel side channel, which is based on shared physical memory and exploits the vulnerabilities of balloon driver. Balloon driver is a very popular mechanism used by current virtual machine managers (VMMs) to balance physical memory among several VMs. Because it is widely used in IaaS cloud, our side channel attack can achieve a high success rate. And compared with current cross-VM side channels, it can transmit more fine-grained data. Using Xen as a case study, we explore how to transmit data by this side channel.
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Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter et al. · 2012 · 785 citations
Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks against Kernel Space ASLR
Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems, Thorsten Holz · 2013 · 400 citations · Full text
HomeAlone: Co-residency Detection in the Cloud via Side-Channel Analysis
Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Alina Oprea et al. · 2011 · 342 citations