American Economic Review · 2016 · 79 citations · 25 references
Social SciencesSocial PsychologyDiscriminationProsocial BehaviorSocial InfluenceEvolution Of CooperationSocial PreferencesSocial SanctionsBilateral Enforcement AgreementsCommunity ForgivenessEnforcementEquilibrium DeviationsForgiveness In RelationshipsInterpersonal ForgivenessVictim Forgiveness
Many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation: if an individual shirks in one relationship, her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her, while continuing to cooperate among themselves. However, a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk, rather than report her victimization truthfully. If guilty players are to be permanently ostracized, then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement. Ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness, through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society. (JEL C73, D83, D85, O17, Z13)
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