Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will

Abstract

United States v. Durham is hailed for its redefinition of the limits of criminal responsibility in mental illness.Almost a century ago a similar redefinition was adopted in New Hampshire,' but until 1954 no American court or legislature had followed this lead.Under the traditional M'Naghten 2 test, which was rejected in these decisions, evidence of mental illness may be considered only if it establishes that the accused was unable to understand the moral quality of his act.Psychiatrists have long complained that this test apparently excludes those serious mental illnesses which make it impossible for the individual to control certain impulses although he recognizes his actions as "wrong."The same criticism has been made again and again by legal writers.In some states (and the District of Columbia) the M'Naghten test has been supplemented by an "irresistible impulse" rule, but many judges have refused to take this step and even where the rule has been recognized it has been rather narrowly applied.Why is it that courts and legislatures have been so tardy in changing the M'Naghten rule?One source of hesitancy has been the tension between the traditions of law and psychiatry in relation to free will.It is important to explore possibilities for relieving this tension if the Durham rule is to have wide adoption and if it is to be successfully administered.In the Durham opinion, the connection between free will and responsibility is explicit. 3 For Judge Bazelon, the issue is as follows: Did the defendant's act stem from mental disease or defect, or was it the result of an exercise of free will?If the latter, moral blame attaches, and criminal responsibility is therefore imposed; if the former, criminal responsibility should not be imposed because moral blame does not attach.