Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government

Abstract

The predominant image of the Taliban is a military organization bent almost exclusively on wreaking havoc on die Afghan state and whoever sides with it. However, for all dieir reputation of mullahs, the Taliban have not altogether neglected die civilian dimensions of power. In die early post-9/11 period, as an insurgent organization, they were indeed little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs who were trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency. They did not have die resources or capacity to develop a shadow government structure. After 2003, however, die situation gradually changed and the Taliban started investing greater resources in dieir shadow government. Apart from die increased availability of financial resources, what might have driven die Taliban's desire for building their own shadow government was dieir diirst for legitimacy. They wanted to show diat they were the authentic government of Afghanistan and not merely an opposition military force. Another reason appears to have been that die Taliban actually realized that a shadow governance structure brought them some practical benefits, such as a greater ability to interact with die population. Particularly since the Taliban started entering relatively heavily populated areas in 2006, their commanders were no longer skilled enough to deal with die villagers. In a sense, the Taliban realized that they could not outfight the forces arrayed against them, which included die strongest military on the planet and a series of allies, also of respectable military capability. They tried, therefore, to outgovern their rivals, identifying the ineffectiveness of Kabul's government as their greatest opportunity.Outgoverning a competitor should not be misunderstood as an alternative rendering of winning hearts and minds. As we shall see in greater detail, governing is not just about offering better services to the public; it is also about the efficient and effective utilization of coercion, a basic ingrethent of the art of government. One example might help clarify this point. A basic but key component of government is the ability to administer justice. However, no government can administer justice without first imposing its own monopoly over it. This is because the administration of justice is inherently divisive: for every individual or community satisfied with a verdict, there might be as many who are unhappy with it.If the emergence of the Taliban's shadow governance structure can be explained, what has always been difficult to assess is its actual impact on the economy of the conflict. Observers, mostly from the media, were either wholly dismissive of anything the Taliban seemed able to achieve on this front, or uncritically supportive of Taliban success. Thanks to interviews carried out with commanders, judges, and other cadres of the Taliban, as well as with local elders, we can attempt in this article to throw some light on the issue.The Taliban's GovernorsThe first signs of Taliban provincial governors date back to 2003, when the Taliban started controlling significant chunks of Afghan territory. From about 2006, district governors and chiefs of security also started being reported. By 2010, 33 provincial governors and about 180 district governors were said to be in existence. The only province without a governor was Panjshir, which was placed under the responsibility of the governor of Parwan.Many observers believed that the new governance system was merely a facade and that its purpose had more to do with public relations and propaganda than anything else. It was a kind of mimicking of the government structure by a movement that had no interest whatsoever in governance and was just bent on destruction. While public relations might well have been a major concern in the rolling out of the new governance structure, it also appears that it gradually started kicking into activity. As of late 2008, there were about two dozen districts in Afghanistan where the Taliban had overwhelming influence; in 11 of those districts, the government had no presence left whatsoever, and at least some of them seemed to be run by Taliban district governors. …