Virtue and sociality in Spinoza

Abstract

Spinoza openly declares in his Ethics, By virtue and power I mean same [E4def8]. When this definition is conjoined with later propo sitions — No virtue can be conceived as prior to this one, namely, conatus to preserve oneself' [E4p22] and As an absolute rule, it is permissible by highest natural right for everyone to do what he judged to be conducive to his own advantage [E4app8] — we may easily conclude that Spinoza is presenting us with a 'might makes right' ethics in which strongest and most powerful are permitted (indeed required) to resort to any measures whatsoever in order to attain their own respective interests. That Spinoza argues for a survival-of-the-fittest may be further suggested by his other writings; for example, we read in Tractatus Politicus, the natural right of each individual, extends as far as its power. Hence... a man... has as much right against other things in nature as he has power over them [TP2:4], Virtuous people, then, are necessitated and have right to do any and every thing within their means to quash, destroy, or subdue anything which is perceived to thwart their own fortunes. Spinoza's ethics appears, therefore, to be somewhat Machiavellian in character, and two thinkers have been closely assimilated in a recent work by Hans Blom: In Spinoza, as in Machiavelli, [self] interest is presented as a new morality [3:221]. His remarks on Machiavelli's supreme acuteness and wisdom [TP5:7, 10:1] should be no surprise to us, since Spinoza holds his predecessor in such high esteem. Despite apparent similarities between concepts of virtue which these two men offer, there is, nevertheless, a major difference: while both writers urge an understanding of virtue as power, Machiavelli relates his notion of virtue only to community leaders, while Spinoza insists that virtue is not a solitary commodity, but rather one which extends to community at large [3:223-24], Spinoza argues that most virtuous, inasmuch as they strive for their own greatest