The Whys and How Comes of Presupposition and NPI Licensing in Questions

Abstract

I argue here against the well-established belief that questions contain existential presuppositions. That is, I will try to refute the view espoused by many researchers that in asking a question like (1) the speaker presupposes that someone saw Harry. (1) Who saw Harry? Katz & Postal (1964, p. 116) equate this supposed existential presupposition with the factive presupposition ‘that Harry used to beat his wife ’ in (2). 1,2 (2) When did Harry stop beating his wife? Postal (1971, p. 73, fn. 6) argues for the existence of existential presuppositions in questions based on their apparent non-defeasibility. According to Postal, “...[(3b)] is just as much a contradiction as [(3a)]. ” That is, if the question ‘What is on the table? ’ presupposes that something is on the table, the questioner contradicts himself by simultaneously asserting that nothing is on the table. (3) a. # Something is on the table and nothing is on the table. b. # Although nothing is on the table, what is on the table? But if (4a) presupposes that someone came, one might wonder why (4b) seems to be a perfectly acceptable answer to this question.