Evidence that monkeys (Macaca tonkeana and Sapajus apella) read moves, but no evidence that they read goals.

Abstract

Whereas most experiments indicate that monkeys have no theory of mind, a study carried out by Wood and collaborators (2007) claimed that they can make inferences about the intentions of another individual. We applied the experimental procedure devised by these authors to investigate whether monkeys can recognize goal-directed actions. We tested 16 Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) and 12 tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella). Each subject was submitted to 24 trials in randomized order. The experimenter presented 2 containers, 1 of which was potentially baited with a food reward. After the experimenter had either intentionally or accidentally made an action on 1 of the containers, the subject was asked to select 1 of them. We found that individuals in both species failed to distinguish between accidental and intentional actions. However, they displayed a significant preference for the container touched by the experimenter in the hand conditions, and not in the elbow conditions. These results do not support those reported by Wood and collaborators, but they are consistent with other studies concluding that monkeys are not capable of mind reading.