Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing

Abstract

II. The Attribute/Self-Ascription View 1. Enter the Attribute/Self-Ascription View: Its Major Core Tenets 2. General Comparison Between Attribute and Proposition Views: Intensionality Adequancy Requirements 3. David Lewis's Attribute/Self-Ascription View 4. Chisholm's Self-Ascription View: General Assessment 5. Chisholm's Self-Ascription View: Intensionality 6. Two Types of Self-Ascription: Unreflective Consciousness and Selfconsciousness 7. Self-Ascription and the Other Types of Indexical Reference 8. Self-Ascription: Its Holistic Character 9. Myself and Others: Quantification and Counting 10. The Manifold Semantics of Self-consciousness and the Syntactic Unidimensionality of the Self-Ascription View 11. Others' Thoughts About Me: Indicators in Indirect Speech 12. Nested Attributions of Self-reference: Quasi-indicators of Higher Degrees 13. Some Crucial Ontological Issues