Side-Channel Attacks: Ten Years After Its Publication and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing.

TLDR

Side‑channel attacks are easy to implement and pose a serious threat to cryptographic modules, targeting primitives, protocols, devices, and systems. The paper surveys side‑channel attack methods, their destructive effects, countermeasures, and evaluates their feasibility, while arguing for the necessity of such testing in developing the FIPS 140‑3 standard and positioning itself as a survey/position paper. It reviews the methods and techniques used in side‑channel attacks, their destructive effects, countermeasures, and assesses their feasibility and applicability. The study finds that adopting physical security testing and evaluation is necessary and feasible for the FIPS 140‑3 standard.

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are easy-to-implement whilst powerful attacks against cryptographic implementations, and their targets range from primitives, protocols, modules, and devices to even systems. These attacks pose a serious threat to the security of cryptographic modules. In consequence, cryptographic implementations have to be evaluated for their resistivity against such attacks and the incorporation of different countermeasures has to be considered. This paper surveys the methods and techniques employed in these attacks, the destructive effects of such attacks, the countermeasures against such attacks and evaluation of their feasibility and applicability. Finally, the necessity and feasibility of adopting this kind of physical security testing and evaluation in the development of FIPS 140-3 standard are explored. This paper is not only a survey paper, but also more a position paper.