Attribute-Based Signatures: Achieving Attribute-Privacy and Collusion-Resistance.

Abstract

We introduce a new and versatile cryptographic primitive called Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS), in which a signature attests not to the identity of the individual who endorsed a message, but instead to a (possibly complex) claim regarding the attributes she posseses. ABS offers: – A strong unforgeability guarantee for the verifier, that the signature was produced by a single party whose attributes satisfy the claim being made; i.e., not by a collusion of individuals who pooled their attributes together. – A strong privacy guarantee for the signer, that the signature reveals nothing about the identity or attributes of the signer beyond what is explicitly revealed by the claim being made. We formally define the security requirements of ABS as a cryptographic primitive, and then describe an efficient ABS construction based on groups with bilinear pairings. We prove that our construction is secure in the generic group model. Finally, we illustrate several applications of this new tool; in particular, ABS fills a critical security requirement in attribute-based messaging (ABM) systems. A powerful feature of our ABS construction is that unlike many other attribute-based cryptographic primitives, it can be readily used in a multi-authority setting, wherein users can make claims involving combinations of attributes issued by independent and mutually distrusting authorities. 1