The Fragmentation of Afghanistan

Abstract

The title of Barnett R. Rubin's richly detailed study of Afghanistan, centered on the war following the communist coup of April 1978, is well suited to Rubin's orientation, which emphasizes the complexity of Afghanistan's society as the principal force in its history. Fragmentation is seen on several levels. The pre-coup Afghan state was fragmented between ethnic groups, and between rulers and the ruled, with the rulers forming a distinct governmental elite distinguished by their formal Western education. The communists were fragmented along similar lines of ethnic and social status, especially Pushtu speakers versus Dari (Afghan Persian) speakers. The Mujahidin resistance to the communist regime was possibly the most fragmented of all. There were hundreds of parties, fronts, regional alliances, and individual commanders, many allied to foreign sources of support along the battle lines of the Cold War. Finally, the story continues through 1993 with the further fragmentation into various resistance organizations during the civil war. Given this emphasis on fragmentation, it is surprising that little attention is given to the ethnic communist splinter party Setam-e-Melli (Against National Oppression) and its leader, Dr. Tahir Badakhshi, one of the founders of the communist People's Democratic Party, or to the militant Pushtun party, Afghan Millat. The first is mentioned only in a footnote, while the most prominent leader of the latter, Muhammad Amin Wahman, is incorrectly identified as a former mayor of Kabul (p. 82). (Ghulam Farhad, the party's founder, was indeed a mayor of Kabul.) A major theme developed throughout the study is that of the rentier state. Dependence on foreign aid from a wide variety of sources, as well as reliance on exports of agricultural commodities and natural resources, freed the various regimes from dependence on internal sources of revenue, such as taxation of land, livestock, commerce, and incomes, as well as profits from government industries. This allowed the pre-1978 state to grow despite its minimal level of contact with and direct control over society. The latter function was left to traditional elites. When the post-1978 communist regime attempted to drastically alter this relationship by eliminating the mediating role of traditional elites, Afghan society refused to comply. The regime was too weak to contain the subsequent armed opposition without direct aid from the USSR. This aid amounted to the direct take-over of the essentials of state power by the Soviets following their military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. None can dispute the importance of fragmentation in the history of Afghanistan. However, the impulse toward state unity in Afghanistan, both before 1978 and during the resistance to the communist regime, should simultaneously be considered. Fragmented as the resistance was, it was known as a jihad (holy struggle) by the overwhelming majority who joined because they viewed it as their Islamic duty. This obligation imposed an effort towards unity of purpose which was fulfilled only by ending the imposed regime. Historically, the Afghan state has existed for over two centuries as an Islamic state. …