Prerogatives Without Restrictions

Abstract

Consequentialists hold that the right act in any situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome, as judged from an impersonal point of view. By contrast, many non-consequentialists maintain that, given any impersonal principle for ranking overall outcomes from best to worst, there will be some circumstances in which one is forbidden to produce the best available outcome so characterized, and still others in which one is permitted but not required to do so. They accept, in other words, both what I call agentcentered restrictions and what I call an agent-centered prerogative.1 In The Rejection of Consequentialism,2 I argued that an agent-centered prerogative is easier to explain and defend than are agent-centered restrictions For, I suggested, whereas it is possible to identify an underlying principled rationale for such a prerogative, a comparable rationale for agentcentered restrictions is surprisingly elusive In consequence, I argued, theories, which depart from consequentialism to the extent of incorporating an agent-centered prerogative, but which do not include agent-centered restrictions, deserve our attention. In the ensuing discussion, a number of writers have argued that hybrid theories have radically counterintuitive implications and cannot be accepted. However, these writers have disagreed among themselves about what conclusion to draw from this. Some have seen the criticism of such theories as helping to vindicate a version of commonsense morality, which is taken to include both prerogatives and restrictions, while others have treated the criticism as casting doubt on the advisability of any departure from consequentialism. The former, in effect, see the alleged defects of hybrid views as helping to supply the missing rationale for agent-centered restrictions. The latter regard the indefensibility of the restrictions as a fixed point, and treat the supposed unacceptability of hybrid views as serving to eliminate another potential rival to consequentialism. In this paper, I will explore the force and significance of some of the objections that generate these divergent responses.