American Political Science Review · 1996 · 227 citations · 6 references
Social SciencesPolitical SciencePublic PolicyLegislative PoliticsLegislative ProcedureParliamentary ProcedureEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean LawEuropean PoliticsEuropean Union StudiesLegislative Agenda-settingAgenda-setting In LegislaturesAgenda-setting InstitutionsAgenda-setting RulesDecision RulesEuropean Union Legislative PoliticsEuropean Union Policy-makingEuropean Union PoliticsParliamentary Agenda Setting
Tsebelis (1994) argues in the American Political Science Review that the European Parliament has important power due to its right as a conditional agenda setter. I claim that Tsebelis' argument is based either on an incomplete analysis or on inaccurately specified decision rules. An accurate modeling of the cooperation procedure as stated in Article 189c of the Treaty of the European Community and as applied in practice changes the results considerably. Based on such a model, I provide an explanation of why the European Parliament sometimes can make successful amendments.
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