Good Samaritans, Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations

Lennart Åqvist

Noûs · 1967 · 120 citations · 3 references

Concepts

Abstract

In this paper we intend to discuss, and to suggest a way out of some puzzling difficulties that arise when one tries to apply any of the current systems of deontic logic to situations where certain familiar combinations of norms and factual statements are asserted. The puzzles with which we shall deal have been separately considered in the literature; it has never been noticed, as far as I know, that they have a common root and are amenable to the same kind of treatment.1 The difficulties in question will be referred to as (i) the Paradox of the Contrary-to-Duty Imperative (CDI), (ii) the Paradox of the Good Samaritan (GS), and (iii) the Paradox of the Epistemic Obligation (EO). CDI is presented and discussed in Chisholm [5] as well as in von Wright [11] and my [4]; an important aspect of it is known as the problem of giving a satisfactory account of commitment (see e.g. Anderson [1], and my [2]). GS is considered notably by Prior [10] and by Nowell-Smith and Lemmon [9], and EO by me in [3], ch. I, sect. 6.2. The puzzles exhibit the following common feature: given a fairly weak standard system of propositional deontic logic, DL, we

References

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