Party Unity and the Decision for War in the House of Representatives, 1812

Abstract

A REVIEW of recent scholarship relating to origins of the War of i8i2 reveals a growing interest in an examination of partisan politics in the Twelfth Congress in explaining the final votes for war. In the mid-ig5os the work of two scholars, John S. Pancake and Margaret K. Latimer, inaugurated the move away from standard interpretations for war compiled by Warren H. Goodman.' Pancake's research centered around a group of Republicans who followed the leadership of Gen. Samuel Smith of Baltimore, Senator from Maryland, and frequently opposed the policies of the Madison administration. In Pancake's view, these Invisibles combined forces the War Hawks in i8ii and pushed President Madison to take strong measures against Great Britain-even as far as war.2 Margaret Latimer also focused on a bloc in Congress during Madison's first administration. She assessed the influence of three young congressmen from South Carolina-John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, and Langdon Cheves-who were elected to the House with reference to the critical condition of the country. Because of the unusual cohesion of opinion within South Carolina, these young congressmen came to Washington committed to the promotion of a vigorous foreign policy. By working the Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, the new delegation from South Carolina became the most aggressive