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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.
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1976
Year
BiasPhilosophical QuarterlyEpistemologyEpistemic JusticeSocial SciencesPhilosophical InquiryPhilosophy (French Literary Studies)Philosophy (Philosophy Of Mind)MisinformationPeter UngerOxford Clarendon Press
Peter Unger argues that nothing can be known or reasoned about, precluding any realistic emotional ties or claims about reality. Unger seeks to overcome this ignorance. He proposes a radical departure from conventional linguistic and epistemological frameworks. The work offers epistemologists and philosophers of mind and language an invaluable perspective on the limits of language.
In this controversial volume (originally published in 1975) Peter Unger suggests that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have a reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot have any realistic emotional ties: it can never be conclusively said that someone is happy or sad about anything. Finally he argues that no one can ever say, let alone believe, that anything is the case. In order to get beyond this apparent bind - and this condition of ignorance - Unger proposes a radical departure from the linguistic and epistemological systems we have become accustomed to. Epistemologists, as well as philosophers of mind and language will undoubtedly find in this study of the limitations of language an invaluable philosophical perspective.