An Anthropology of Religion and Magic, I

Abstract

ends such as prosperity and salvation. failure distinguish meaning of an action from action itself blinded recognition that many different motivational purposes can be served by same customary performance, and that distinction between acts informed by ultimate concerns as against those directed toward immediate goals is constantly blurred when achievement of tangible good is made stand symbolically for more general one. only way one can know whether or not one is blessed is through concrete signs in one's daily life, even if these are not material signs of prosperity, but rather more subtle but no less experiential ones of personal mood.IZ For Pacific islanders among whom lived, those acts which he labelled magical were, like almost all of their actions, usually directed toward dealing with or preventing specific difficulties. But he assumed saying of spells and like can never have direct practical results, despite what natives think. Thus accepted one part of natives' interpretation of their actions but rejected another part. resulting paradox then posed following question: Why were these ineffective magical procedures tried over I2 The fact remains, of course, that for devout sacred value, first and above all, has been psychological state in here and now. Primarily this state consists in emotional attitude per se, which was directly called forth by specifically religious (or magical) act, by methodical asceticism, or by contemplation. Max Weber (trans. Hans Gerth and C. W. Mills), The Social Psychology of World Religions, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, I958), 278 (his italics.) This content downloaded from 157.55.39.208 on Fri, 29 Jul 2016 06:07:30 UTC All use subject http://about.jstor.org/terms RELIGION AND MAGIC, I | 79 and over again? Malinowski's answer was that they fill need of actor, one which actor himself does not recognize. Among these ocean fishermen, magic was resort taken only when other means failed, when their technical capabilities were felt be inadequate deal with task at hand. They never used magic attempt impossible, such as flying through air, nor did they ever use magic for tasks that could be handled simply and directly. However, for dangerous and problematic enterprises, such as deep sea fishing, they would employ charms, incantations, and like. argued from these facts that magical acts must give fishermen feeling of added confidence, and that one outcome of their renewed assurance was, indeed, more efficient fishing.I3 Thomas appears hold position similar that of Malinowski. It is difficult for reader pin down his precise theoretical orientation, partly because he attempts maintain his freedom from limitations of any particular approach by indicating objections each theory as he discusses it, and partly because his own assumptions about workings of human societies and minds remain unexamined. I am aware therefore that following formulation of Thomas' views about relationships among beliefs, behavior, and motivation may not be accurate. He seems assume that, although origin of specific practices is historical in that we inherit each assemblage of customs and beliefs from our predecessors, their continued enactment and transmission next generation is be explained in terms of satisfaction of needs, either psychological or sociological. Since in this view societal needs are mediated by individual agents-responding, holding attitudes, and acting-such need-fulfillment theory reduces psychological one. Every important custom has its pragmatic or emotional value for some members of society, or else it falls into disuse and is forgotten. In this light, certain of Thomas' discussions make sense. He suggests, for instance, that before Reformation Church was a limitless source of supernatural aid, applicable most of problems likely arise in daily life. theologians of early Reformation attempted to dispense with this whole apparatus of supernatural assistance. But, he points out, the problems for which 13 E. R. Leach, The Epistemological Background Malinowski's Empiricism, and Talcott Parsons, Malinowski and Theory of Social Systems, both in Raymond Firth (ed.), Man and Culture: An Evaluation of Work ofBronislaw (London, 1957), II9-I37, 53-70. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.208 on Fri, 29 Jul 2016 06:07:30 UTC All use subject http://about.jstor.org/terms