Truth and Singular Terms

Abstract

Non-denoting singular terms have been a prime stimulus, or irritant, to students of the use and formal representation of language. Only one other subject (modal logic) has provoked so many differences among logicians over which sentences should be counted valid. It may be that in the case of singular terms these differences are not fully resolvable, especially in light of the various purposes that logical analyses serve. But there are, I think, means of narrowing our options in choosing logical axioms. This paper is devoted to exploring one such means.1 I will be viewing a logic of singular terms in the context of a truth-theoretic account of natural-language sentences under their intended interpretations. As a consequence, I shall. take' native intuitions about truth conditions and truth values as evidence in framing a semantical theory for native sentences and for framing a logic underlying that theory. Within this context, I shall argue that some proposed logics for singular terms are unsatisfactory because they lead from true premises to untrue conclusions and that others are faulty because they are too weak to justify transformations needed for an adequate theory of truth. I shall conclude by arguing that one otherwise plausible logical axiom is incompatible with a straightforward means of avoiding these difficulties. I begin by motivating and sketching an account of singular terms which will set the stage for these points.