Truth and Ideology: Reflections on Mannheim's Paradox

The very juxtaposition of the terms and may suggest that they are antagonistic and irreconcilable; and, indeed, when they are treated together it is usually by writers who deplore ideology, alleging that it is a misrepresentation of truth or reality. Often, moreover, this attitude is accompanied by claims that ideology is impractical, absolute, dogmatic, totalitarian, or all of these; and usually there is a plea for the end of ideology in politics, or a prediction that ideology will eventually be overcome. ' My interest in the topic, on the contrary, does not arise from a dislike of ideology as such, though I have objections to the substance of particular ideologies and to the uses to which some ideologies have been put. I do not presuppose that ideologies are inherently evil or dangerous, though I acknowledge the existence of ideologies which I consider to be both. And I do not call for an end to ideology in politics, for I assume that ideologies are an inevitable and even necessary part of modem political life. I am concerned, rather, to analyze the assumption that truth and ideology are antithetical that ideology is an inherently distorted and therefore false system of beliefs and I wish to demonstrate why this assumption is neither necessary nor desirable. The view that ideology is inherently distorted and false is given its most forceful and enduringly influential expression in Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. It is with Mannheim's argument, therefore, that I am mainly concerned, and, in the pages to follow, I recapitulate his position, argue that it is deficient, and offer an alternative to it. Finally, I indicate some possible methodological consequences of the alternative positionconsequences which I believe would significantly enhance the study of ideology.